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JEWISH-GENTILE INTERMARRIAGE IN SIX EUROPEAN CITIES 
1900-1940. EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES AND TRENDS 
WOUT ULTEE AND RUUD LUIJKX 
1. From questions on class and the expansion of social rights to questions 
on minorities and the loss of civil rights 
Sociology's findings on 20th-century Europe contradict the Marxist notion of 
class strife in market economies (Lenski 1966, Lipset 1981, Ultee, Arts & Flap 
1992). In~ed, there is ample support for the Hegelian idea that wars between 
nations decide the fate of individuals. Early in the 20th century, Armenians 
were sent on death marches. through the Ottoman Empire. In World War ll, 
Germany deported Jews to extermination camps. At the end of the 20th centu-
ry, Serbs cleansed Bosnia by executing Muslims. 
Compared to its focus on universal suffrage and the expansion of social 
rights, sociology has assigned low priority to the denial of civil rights to par-
ticular inhabitants of 20th-century Europe. According to Marshall (1950), the 
expansion of social rights in the Umted Kingdom after World War ll was the 
latest phase in an evolution covering 250 years. First, there were. civil rights, 
which contributed to universal political rights, and they led in turn to social 
rights. This notion has guided a comprehensive research program comparing 
industrial societies (Korpi 1989). Yet, Marshall's thesis does not square with the 
gerrymandering in Northern Ireland from the 1920s to the 1960s, which dimin-
ished the effects of the Catholics' right to vote. In addition, Marshall's list of 
civil rights is uneven. Apart from the right to a fair trial, it includes the right to 
marry the person of one's choice irrespective of differences in class, creed, 
descent, or race. 
This article addresses the right of Jews and Gentiles to marry each other, the 
extent to which it resulted in Jewish-Gentile intermarriages, and the factors 
influencing their incidence.' To this end, time series for six European cities 
have been studied. These towns - all but one are capitals, each with a sizeable 
percentage of Jewish inhabitants, and varying widely in their timing of Jewish 
legal emancipation - are Amsterdam in the Netherlands, Berlin and Frankfurt-
on-Main in Germany, Budapest in Hungary, Riga in "Latvia, and Vienna in 
Austria. Cross-tabulations of the religion of husbands and wives for all mar-
riages concluded in one year have been taken from governmental statistical 
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publications. The longest series pertains to Budapest in 1900-1943. The series 
for Berlin and Frankfurt continue into Hitler's rule and the ones for Amsterdam 
and Vienna include a number of years of German occupation. 
Our findings on Jewish-Gentile intermarriage bear on two long-standing 
ideas (Katz 1972). The frrst is that Jewish legal emancipation inexorably leads 
to economic equality, social acceptance by Gentiles, and the eventual disap-
pearance of Jewry. As regards the objection that the changes were not rapid and 
all-encompassing, this idea was augmented with the hypothesis that anti-
Semitic prejudices gradually fade away. The second idea is that opposition to 
Jewish emancipation in once-Christian societies is inevitable, with unsuccess-
ful Gentile attempts to revoke legal equality for Jews provoking ever more 
tumultuous anti-Semitic outbursts. Acknowledging that anti-Semitism was not 
manifest in some European states, this idea has been supplemented by the 
proposition that the longer anti-Semitism remains latent in a country, the more 
violence will eventually occur. Although these ideas contradict each another, 
they agree that 'things happen as they are bound to happen.' 
This article pursues a middle ground between these two variations on the 
theme that trends are inevitable. It does so by stating hypotheses on conditions 
increasing or decreasing the degree of Jewish-Gentile integration. It probes 
these. propositions by taking. intermarriage as an indication of integration. 
Before presenting OUr propositions in section 4, in section 2, we outline the 
importance of questions· about Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in. Europe before 
and during World War II. We argue that they have been overlooked, although 
they are sub-questions of questions about the persecution of the Jews before 
and during World War II and these questions are in turn sub-questions of soci-
ology's main questions. Section 3 depicts the changing legal position of Jews 
in our six cities. Section 5 discusses our research design, section 6 focuses on 
the measurements. In sections 7 to 10, we present research findings testing our 
hypotheses. Section 11 sums up the results. 
2. Sociology's main questions, questions about the persecution of the Jews, 
questions about Jewish-Gentile intermarriage 
Bauman (1989) holds that although questions about the Holocaust are sub-
questions of sociology's central questions, sociologists have devoted little 
attention to the Shoah. He rejects interpretations that view the decimation of 
Jewry as an aberration on the path to modernity. His theory is that the Holocaust 
was 'a characteristically modern phenomenon that cannot be understood out of 
the context of cultural tendencies and technical achievements of modernity' 
(Bauman 1989: xiii). We concur that questions about the war Hitler won are 
sub-questions of sociology's main questions. These larger questions highlight 
inequality and strife (Ultee, Arts & Flap 1992) and the Holocaust is the extreme 
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example of human degradation and violence. We nonetheless think that 
Bauman's thesis that sociology has overlooked the Holocaust does not apply at 
all to a well-known debate in sociology. More importantly, Bauman confines 
the persecution of the Jews to the destruction of European Jewry. In this way, 
questions about earlier phases, for example before and after Jewish-Gentile 
intermarriage was prohibited, receive less attention. Yet, answers to questions 
about the initial stages do bear on the often implicit but rather forceful idea that 
things happen as they are bound to happen. Bauman briefly dismissed this 
explanation without developing a full-fledged alternative. 
Is sociology's interest in the persecution of the Jews as limited as Bauman 
assumes? Elias has asserted that the main question raised by the mass murder 
of Jewish men, women, and children in the name of the German nation is not 
the genocide as such. In the Ancient World, there were various instances of 
what is now called genocide. The question sociologists should address is why 
after World War II people could not believe these things had happened in a 
highly industrialized society (Elias 1989: 45-46 and 394-395). We agree with 
Bauman that questions about events on the way to and at the annihilation camps 
should be addressed. People did the inconceivable- why? Yet, persecution did 
not start in 1942 when Jews were first crammed into "showers" and gassed. So, 
in the line of Bauman's reasoning, we contend that questions about what hap-
pened before the Jews were rounded up in camps are important as well. 
Germany outlawed marriages between Aryans and Jews in 1935. How often did 
Jews and Gentiles marry each other before it was prohibited?· 
Yet, Bauman's thesis that sociologists have overlooked the Holocaust over-
looks a marked moment. Popper's 1961 address to Germany's sociologists and 
Adorno's co-lecture are not about how sociology should tackle its questions. 
They are about these questions themselves. Depicting the difference between 
his position and Adorno's, Popper holds that the world we live in is the best 
ever, whereas Adorno disagrees. Adorno (1962: 141-142) fmds it difficult to 
believe there was never a better world than the one, that begot Auschwitz. 
Is Adorno thus propagating Holocaust questions? Popper (1945) holds that 
social theorists postulating irreversible trends are enemies of societies that 
accept that knowledge is fallible, grant that their rulers are not always wise, and 
propagate free discussion. Popper also holds that the 20th-century popularity of 
the ideas on historical destiny that were propounded by Hegel and Marx pro-
moted the rise of the closed societies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. 
Horkheimer &Adorno (1947) are steeped in Hegelianism and Marxism. Myths 
arise when people become enlightened and anti-Semitism is part of this dialec-
tic development. Popper backs his hypotheses with an in-depth analysis of spe-
cific theories, Horkheimer & Adorno adorn theirs with obfuscating language. It 
is not surprising that Adorno's appeal to upgrade questions on World War II only 
met with limited approval. Popper studied them thoroughly. Bauman's. thesis 
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that sociology overlooked the Holocaust overlooks this episode in sociology. 
Given this oversight, it is striking that Bauman (1989: 17-18, 66) notes that 
bureaucracies were not a sufficient cause for the Holocaust. They were a neces-
sary condition. The opportunities they provided were exploited by racism. This 
is a type of social engineering that is in keeping with modern culture. Following 
Popper, we insist that racism is pre-modern engineering and that modernity is 
more than bureaucracy. 
According to Popper (1945), social engineering comes in two kinds. One 
form first selects its ultimate aims and then employs the most efficient means to 
put them into effect. This utopian engineering requires strong leadership, which 
makes for a closed society. Another type focuses on concrete social wrongs to be 
alleviated. It involves a choice of means and permits new priorities. This piece-
meal engineering thrives in societies that separate powers and grant their inhab-
itants rights, i.e., in modern or open societies. Bauman (1989: 66) says racism 
only comes into its own if there is also a design for the perfect society and an 
intention to implement it through planned effort. In short, we hold that racism is 
utopian engineering that is out of line with modernity. 
In addition, we maintain. that contemporary societies display features that 
have been: collectively termed modern. One is bureaucracy, the separation of 
powers is ~other, ·and so is a bill of rights. Were the Jews killed while they were 
citizens and while the powers of the state were separated? ~azism did away with 
independent powers by introducing the Fiihrer-Prinzip.
2 
One by one, it deprived 
the Jews of their citizens' rights. When Germany occupied other countries, it· 
abolished the separation of powers and deprived the Jews there of their rights. 
However, individual rights, the separation of powers, and wars do not feature in 
Bauman's answer to the question about the Holocaust. It ignores the fact that the 
persecution of the Jews was a process that gradually increased in strength. 
So Bauman's answer to the question of why the Holocaust occurred is only 
a fragment, since his question remained so simple. Is the issue just why the Jews 
were murdered or is it also why the percentage of murdered Dutch Jews was 
higher than the percentage of murdered Belgian Jews? Is the question only about 
genocide or is it also about earlier phases? As Hilberg (1961) so extensively 
demonstrates, the murder of the Jews in World War II was the fmal stage in a 
process of legal exclusion and social isolation. Naturally, scholars have 
described the later phases in greater detail than the earlier periods. Yet the first 
steps are also relevant and Hilberg has detailed most of them. Bauman down-
sizes their importance when he notes that the Holocaust was 'so to speak, a log-
ical (though, remember, unanticipated at the start) outcome of the many steps 
taken before (Bauman 1989: 192).'This thesis seems incompatible with the idea 
that things happen as they are bound to happen. Yet it is so fuzzy that it cannot 
be seen as the outcome of a piece of research, but at best as the start of an exer-
cise in theory formation. 
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However, if things did not happen as they were bound to happen, how exact-
ly did they occur? Was it, as Bauman asserts, just because some ideology took 
advantage of the available technology? If questions about the early phases 
receive more attention, a full-blown alternative to predestination might emerge. 
This article focuses on one early stage, i.e., the extent to which Jews and 
Gentiles intermarried. Hilberg (1961) does not detail this phenomenon. We 
describe it here and we test explanations of the differences between the various 
cities and the trends within them. 
3. The Jews of Europe: gradual emancipation and renewed exclusion 
As a background to the hypotheses presented in the next section, we now sketch 
the legal status of the Jews in the six cities. 3 
Human rights came to the Dutch Republic in 1795 and the 1656 ban on mar-
riages between Christians and Jews was annulled. Later marriage laws never 
regarded denominational differences as an impediment. 
The Jews of Frankfurt-on-Main obtained equal rights in 18ll, but were 
denied thein again. in 1815. In 1853, Jews were granted the right to vote on the 
same terms as Gentiles~ but not. the right to be· elected. Emancipation was 
attained in Frankfurt in 1864. In Prussia's capital Berlin, Jews gained equal· 
rights with the 1812 edict, although it postponed a decision about the right to 
hold public office. In 1822, Jews we~ explicitly excluded from them, but the 
1850 Prussian Constitution granted Jews the right to hold civil positions. Since 
· it stipulated that Prussia was a Christian state, these rightS remained void. 
Jewish emancipation was part of the 1869 Constitution of the North German 
Confederation and Germany's 1871 Constitution. The 1875 marriage laws of 
Germany no longer prohibited inter-denominational marriages. 
The Vienna Congress of 1815 refused to upgrade the status of the Jews in 
Austria-Hungary. In 1848, a proposal allowing Jews to serve a public function 
was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament but rejected by the Hungarian King, 
the Austrian Emperor. The Ausgleich of 1867 resulted in a new Constitution for 
Austria-Hungary. Civil and political rights were not dependent on any religion 
whatsoever. Hungary introduced civil marriage in 1895, making marriages 
between Christians and Jews a legal option. Until the 1938 Anschluss, Austrian 
Civil Law made church marriage obligatory. According to Section 64, mar-
riages between Christians and non-Christians were not allowed. 
Before 1917, Riga was part of Russia, where Jewish-Gentile marriages were 
forbidden. In 1841, the frrst Jews officially settled in Riga. When Russia lost 
World War I, Riga became the capital of independent Latvia. Jews now had 
equal legal status. In 1934, Ulmanis curtailed the autonomy of Jewish schools 
and restricted Jewish economic activity by a permit system. In 1940, the Soviet 
Union invaded Latvia, and in 1941, Germany occupied Latvia. 
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In 1920, Hungary limited the percentage of Jews at the universities to six. 
In 1938, the First Jewish Law restricted the percentage of Jews in certain occu-
pations to 20 and the Second Jewish Law limited it to five in 1939. In 1941, the 
third one banned Jewish-Gentile marriages, and in March 1944, Germany 
invaded Hungary. 
Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in January 1933. A law passed in 
April that year authorized the dismissal of non-Aryan civil servants. The 
Nuremberg Laws of September 15, 1935 deprived Jews of citizenship and pro-
hibited new marriages between Aryans and Jews. After the 1938 Anschluss, 
marriages between Aryans and Jews were forbidden in Austria. Germany 
invaded the Netherlands in May 1940. The Joodsche Weekblad of March 27, 
1942 stated that the German authorities had forbidden Jews to marry non-Jews. 
4. Exclusion and isolation, emancipation and integration 
We have perused the literature for hypotheses 4 on the propensity of Jews and 
Gentiles to intermarry, and for interesting parallels. We have welded what we 
found together by deriving all our hypotheses from a limited number of 
assumptions. It turned out that some current hypotheses only invoke certain 
kinds of"factors.5 In addition, we have specified long-standing statements. We 
begin with a hypothesis on the year when particular laws were adopted. We then 
explain jt and derive two additional hypotheses on opportunities for intermar-
riage. Expanding the proposition that opportunities shape behavior, we. obtain 
.two hypotheses on the likes and dislikes on the part ofJews arid Gentiles.6 
The passage of time 
Our initial proposition is that Jewish legal emancipation fostered the integra-
tion7 of Jews and Gentiles. Taking intermarriage as an indicator and assuming 
that it takes time for legal possibilities to turn into options that people perceive 
as practicable, we derive that the longer ago a city's Jews were emancipated, 
the more Jewish-Gentile marriages will occur. According to Katz (1973: 202-
205), this hypothesis does not apply to 19th-century Europe. Even well-off 
Jews remained conspicuously separate. However, up to now we have not spec-
ified how long it takes for equal rights to have effects. A more informative 
hypothesis holds that integration increases minimally at fJfSt and then substan-
tially, and flattens out in the end, but not necessarily at the point of panmixia. 
Although historians have described the struggle for Jewish constitutional 
emancipation in great detail, we think that an emancipation hypothesis is less 
applicable than one about marriage laws and time. Mter all, a constitution may 
give Jews rights equal to those of Gentiles, but it takes time for this constitu-
tion to be supplemented by corresponding marriage laws. As we noted, Austrian 
law made marriage a matter for the clergy, rendering Jewish-Christian mar-
) 
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riages impossible. A more plausible proposition therefore refers to the amount 
of time since mixed marriage was first permitted. Religiously mixed marriages 
can be contracted if states force the clergy to perform them or if states conclude 
marriages themselves. Our hypothesis, first suggested by Ruppin (1934), is that 
the longer marriages between Jews and Gentiles have been legally possible in 
a city, the higher the chances of Gentile-Jewish marriages. Columns 1 and 2 in 
Table 1 provide the initial conditions for applying our emancipation and mar-
riage laws hypothesis. 
TABLE! 
JEWISH-GENTILE INI'ERMARRIAGB IN THE EARLY 20m CENTURY IN SIX EUROPEAN ClTIIlS AND POSSWI.E EXPLANATIONS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Equal political 
Right to 
Jewish-Gentile Residential Educational Orthodox Political anti- Jewish-Gentile 
rights marriage segregation segregation Judaism Semitism marriages 
Amsterdam 6 3 4 
Berlin 3 2-3 2 4 4 5 2 
Budapest 4-5 4 2 2 4 
Frankfurt. 2 2-3 3 5 5 6 3 
Riga .6 6 5 6 6 2 6 
Vienna 4-5 5 4 3 3 5 
1 =longest 1 =longest 1 =leaSt 1 =least 1 =least 1 =lowest 1 =highest 
period. period segregation · segregation orthodoxy frequency ·prevalence 
6 =shortest 6=shortest 6=most 6=most 6=most ():highest 6=lowest 
period Perlod segregation segregation orthodoxy frequency prevalence 
Sources: see texL 
One implication of our marriage laws hypothesis is that legal exclusion iso-
lates Jews from Gentiles. This corollary seems trivial, but it is not without sub-
stance. To begin with, the interpretation of prohibitions can alter. We will see 
that Austrian marriage law was not what it seemed to be. In addition, it is pos-
sible that Gentile-Jewish marriages were increasingly avoided before they were 
prohibited. Our exclusion hypothesis is that before the introduction of the 
Nuremberg Laws, the chances of Jewish-Gentile marriage were high and sta-
ble, and did not drop until afterwards. According to this proposition, they were 
also high before the legal status of the Jews began to deteriorate. 
Up to now, our statements have taken cities as the prime unit~ They can be 
derived from the individual proposition that people do things they are allowed 
to do. If we generalize it into the hypothesis that the more opportunities people 
have to do something, the more likely they are to do it, and concretize this 
proposition, we arrive at two more hypotheses. They specify the link between 
the right to intermarry and actual intermarriage. 
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Additional opportunities 
If people intermarry because they have opportunities to meet one another 
(Blau & Schwartz 1984), then one prediction is: the weaker the residential seg-
regation of Gentiles and Jews in a city, the more likely Jews and Gentiles are 
to intermarry. This residential segregation hypothesis echoes Lieberson's 
(1961) fmding for ten big cities in the United States in 1930: an immigrant 
group's residential segregation limits its degree of intermarriage. The residen-
tial segregation thesis implies that if for some reason residential segregation 
increases after emancipation, intermarriage may remain the same. 
Another proposition pertains to a city's school system as an opportunity 
and holds that cities with separate parochial schools have less intermarriage 
than cities with mixed schools. Ford (1968) notes that in Great Britain com-
prehensive schools foster friendships between social classes. If education 
becomes more segregated after emancipation, then according to an implication 
of our educational segregation hypothesis, the likelihood of intermarriage 
might decrease. 
Aversions 
Up to now, our effort at theory formation only addresses opportunities for peo-. 
pie of different religions to marry each other. Afull theory includes desires and 
dislikes. In early 20th-century European Judaism, there was a Reform and an 
Orthodox current. There w~e also Jews who were indifferent.· Assuming that 
Orthodox opposition to outmarriage is stronger than Reform resistance and 
that indifferent Jews are unconcerned, we derive our orthodoxy hypothesis: the 
more orthodox a city's Jews, the smaller the chance of intermarriage. 
Our hypothesis on Gentile likes and ·dislikes assumes that voting for an 
anti-Semitic political party indicates an aversion to Jews. Thus the more votes 
there are for the anti-Semitic parties in a city's elections, the smaller the 
chances of Gentile-Jewish intermarriage. Paraphrasing our anti-Semitism 
hypothesis, in cities where more and more people vote for anti-Semitic parties, 
the legal exclusion of Jews is presaged in earlier lower chances of Jewish-
Gentile intermarriage. 
As was noted above, our hypotheses constitute a system. On its own, our 
first hypothesis says that the longer ago Jewish legal emancipation occurred in 
a city, the more likely Gentile-Jewish marriages will be. However, since it is 
part of a system, it assumes that the other factors of our theory do not change. 
Thus our theory does not predict an irreversible trend towards more mixed 
marriages after Jewish emancipation. It implies that if residential and educa-
tional segregation increase, the anti-Semitic vote grows and Orthodoxy 
spreads in a city, there will be a trend towards less outmarriage. Our theory 
does not say how these intermediate factors develop. It does hold that legal 
changes largely affect intermarriage in a roundabout manner. They primarily 
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influence Jewish-Gentile intermarriage by way of residential and educational 
segregation, as well as through anti-Semitism and Orthodoxy. 
5. Research design 
Our hypotheses on the strength of the tendency towards intermarriage have 
been derived from individual-level assumptions and we have data on several 
million couples. However, since these data come in bivariate tables for cities; 
our design pertains to five independent variables (marriage laws, residential 
segregation, educational segregation, anti-Semitism, and Orthodoxy) and six 
cities. Thus, our analysis may run the risk of drawing large conclusions from 
small numbers (Lieberson 1991) and of committing the ecological fallacy 
(Robinson 1950). However, our design allows for a more stringent test of our 
hypotheses than this methodological criticism might suggest. These remarks 
not only overlook the fact that we observed most of our cities some thirty 
times, they wrongly presuppose that causal hypotheses can be established 
empirically. We replace foUl1dationalist by falsificationist methods. Truths 
never get proven, and there are no definitive tests. At best, up until a certain 
moment hypotheses have withstood tests against specific data. Yet, certain 
hypotheses are more testable than others and the more testable propositions 
are, the better starting points they provide for further research (Popper 1959). 
Our anti-foundationalist stance leads us to elaborate five points. 
1. According to falsificationist methods, causality cannot even be inferred 
from a high number of cases. The crucial thing about data is nbt th.e number of 
cases, but the severity of the test they entail. This is why six cities, with more 
than a century's difference as regards the timing of laws allowing Jewish-
Gentile intermarriage, constitute a particularly useful sample. 
2. Lieberson's remark that sociology is probabilistic is less than convinc-
ing. Given the yardstick of testability, deterministic hypotheses have an edge 
over probabilistic ones. As Popper (1959) demonstrates, probability statements 
are unfalsifiable. We add that although the proposition that Jews and people 
without a religion are more likely to intermarry than Jews and Catholics refers 
to chances, it is contradicted by research findings if in a large city with a size-
able percentage of Jewish inhabitants, for just one year Jews and Catholics are 
more likely to intermarry than Jews and persons who do not belong to a reli-
gious community. In this case, individual probability statements have deter-
ministic implications at the level of cities. 
3. In falsificationism, the argument of an ecological fallacy lacks force. 
The truth of a macro-proposition does not logically imply the truth of the cor-
responding micro-thesis. Yet, if intermarriage turns out to be stronger in cities 
with more residential segregation than in less segregated ones, it is difficult to 
maintain that Jews in ffiixed neighborhoods outmarry more than Jews in 
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Jewish ones. If macro-predictions are derived from micro-hypotheses, a test of 
the former is also a test of the latter. A test of a micro-thesis by aggregate data 
is more severe if hypotheses about the composition of neighborhoods or other 
contexts do not hold. In our case, we hold, contenders of this kind do not con-
stitute strong competitors. The proposition that if more of a city's Jews are 
orthodox, the town's secular Jews are less likely to marry Gentiles addresses 
the composition of the city where Jews live and seems plausible. Yet this con-
textual hypothesis does not supplant the micro-proposition that Orthodox Jews 
are less likely to intermarry than secular ones. It is a supplement. 8 
4. According to Campbell (1975), if the number of cases is small, bringing 
in additional dependent variables can increase testability. In this article, the 
design does not simply involve Jewish-Gentile intermarriage, but Jewish-
Catholic, Jewish-Protestant, and Jewish-Other intermarriage as well. In addi-
tion, we test whether hypotheses on differences between cities at one point in 
time explain trends in the course of time in these cities. 
5. We amplify Campbell's argument by increasing the testability of our 
hypotheses. Our propositions not only say that factors have some effect, they 
specify the direction of these consequences. In addition, our theory specifies 
the time-order of factors. If this theory holds, deviations from the marriage 
laws hypothesis must be accounted for by one of our other theses. Note that in 
Table 1 the association between the factor 'rlght to J~wish-Gentile marriage' 
and our other independent variables is not perfect. So although we have five 
factors and.six cases, we are well-placed to test our theory. 
6. Data 
We have tested hypotheses on time series for six major European cities with a 
sizeable percentage of Jews. We have taken cities rather than countries, 
because intermarriage measures should pertain to an actual marriage market. 
We have opted for large cities rather than small towns because in the countries 
and decades data are available for, Jews were concentrated in large cities. We 
have sought data for major cities with a sizeable percentage of Jewish inhabi-
tants; otherwise the figures would wobble. We have tried to obtain time series 
for as many cities as possible that satisfy our requirements, but given the vary-
ing detail of their population registers, we have settled for data from 
Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest, Frankfurt, Riga, and Vienna. We limit our series 
to the four decades before World War II, since data for a longer period were 
unavailable.9 
Intermarriage tables 
Intermarriage tables have been assigned the same format by collapsing the 
religions into four categories, i.e., Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Other (includ-
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ing persons without a religion). The Appendix lists the sources for these tables 
and the sources for the explanatory variables discussed below. 
For some cities, certain tables are missing. Riga has th~ most missing years. 
The Riga series starts in 1911, skips 1919, and ends in 1938. For 1911-1915, 
1916-1920, 1924-1925, and 1926-1927 it pertains to periods longer than a year. 
A city with fewer missing years is Vienna. Tables are lacking for 1921-1926, 
1930, 1933-1934, and the year of the Anschluss. The series for Vienna begins 
in 1900 and stops in 1941. The Berlin series commences in 1900, the one for 
Frankfurt in 1901. They do not have any interruptions. Both of these series end 
earlier than we would have liked, but the effects of Hitler's ascent to power 
should show up in the Berlin series, which stops in 1938, and the one for 
Frankfurt, which ends in 1935 (with 1938 added). The series for Budapest 
begins in 1900, stops for 1917-1919, and ends in 1943. 
The data for Amsterdam cover the entire period from 1911 to 1943. Data for 
1900-1910 are guestimates. For this period, there is data on how many Jews 
married Jews, Protestants married Protestants and so forth. However, in publi-
cations the number of Jewish males who married Protestant females was added 
to the number of Protestant males who married Jewish females and so forth. To 
arrive at frequencies for each separate possibility, we have takeD the 1911-1939 
tables as our starting point and then compute the ratio of the number of Jewish 
men who married Protestant women and the nUm.ber of Protestant men who 
married Jewish women, and so forth. This ratio has been applied to the avail-
able.summed frequencies for 1900-1910. · 
Our tables mdicate the religion of people on the day when they got married. 
This raises a question as to what they reveal about integration. It is ·clear that if 
people convert before they get married so as to have the same religion as their 
future spouse, this does not show up in the intermarriage figures. The same goes 
for people who convert to their spouse's religion after they get married. Thus it 
is possible that if rising chances of intermarriage were to be observed in a city, 
it might only be because the people there who used to convert before marrying 
no longer do so. However, we know of no theory that yields such a precise pre-
diction. Indeed, if people no longer convert before they get married, in itself 
this indicates more integration.
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To what extent the Viennese figures are useful for comparative research is a 
more complex matter. Austrian law made it obligatory to get married in church. 
It would allow for a couple involving at least one person without a religion to 
have a Notcivilehe. Given this legal option, the number of marriages with at 
least one person without a religion includes some marriages between Christians 
and Jews. If people convert to the religion of their spouse to surmount legal bar-
riers, the Vienna. figures underestimate the Gentile-Jewish integration there. 
However, the assertion that marriages between Christians and Jews were 
prohibited in Austria should not be taken at face value. This is obvious from all 
the Viennese figures since 1915: every year there are, sizeable numbers of 
Catholic-Jewish and Jewish-Protestant marriages. Pisko (1933) states that 
although marriages between Christians and non-Christians could not be con-
cluded in a routine way in Austria, this impediment was dispensable, and 
according to Section 83, municipal authorities could give dispensations without 
any interference from the judiciary. We assume that when the Social Democrats 
gained political power in Vienna at the start of World War I, dispensations were 
given for Gentile-Jewish marriages. The Vienna data for 1915 and later may be 
used to ascertain integration by intermarriage. 
Residential segregation 
Almost all the data on Gentile-Jewish residential segregation come from a cen-
sus. The data for Amsterdam pertain to 1906, 1920, 1930, and 1941. They 
divide the city into some 50 districts. The figures for Berlin refer to 1910, 1925, 
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1933, and 1939 and involve 20 districts. The ones for Budapest refer to 10 dis-
tricts and the years 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1941. Frankfurt's figures per-
tain to 14 districts in 1895, 1910, and 1925. The figures for Riga involve 12 dis-
tricts in 1913, 1920, 1925, and 1930 and 39 in 1935. The data for Vienna cover 
21 districts in 1900, 1910, 1923, 1934, and 1939. 
Following the Pax Duncana, we have measured residential segregation with 
dissimilarity indices. The lower the index, the more mixed the housing is. It is 
not prudent to compare indices for cities that differ strongly as regards the num-
ber of districts. This is why we have regrouped Amsterdam's 50 districts into 
11 ones.
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The indices are given in Table 2. All in all, residential segregation was 
strongest in Amsterdam and weakest in Budapest. We rank the cities according 
to the extent to which Jews and Gentiles live in different districts in column 3 
ofTable 1. 
Table 2 shows that the dissimilarity index for Amsterdam decreased. We 
regard the rise in 1941 as an effect of the inflow in 1933-1939 of some 10,000 
Jewish refugees from Germany into the newly-built suburbs. Berlin's index 
rose steadily; at first Budapest's dropped and stabilized in the 1920s, only to 
rise again in 1941. We cannot ascertain a trend for Frankfurt since the data for 
1933and 1939 are niissing, but a rather strong overall mcrease in the dissimi-
1 larity index seems likely. Riga's index increased somewhat.
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In Vieruia, there 
was virtual stability until 1934 and a rise in separation afterwards. The increas-
es or decreases in a city's residential segregation are compm;ed in column 2 of 
Table 3. Its column 1 ranks the cities according to the number of years that 
passed since the introduction of the right to enter into a Jewish-Gentiie mar-
riage. Both of the columns and other ones as well will be used to test dynamic 
derivations from our hypotheses. 
Educational segregation 
In Austria and Hungary, most schools were required to enroll pupils of all reli-
gions. Catholics, Jews, and Protestants attended the same primary schools. 
There were special teachers for religious instruction. In Germany (Field 1980), 
some Volksschule were Simultanschule, mixing Catholic and Protestant pupils. 
Most schools were either Catholic or Protestant. They had to enroll Jewish 
pupils as well and sometimes instructed them in Judaism. In the Netherlands, 
until 1918, the state partly subsidized parochial schools. Public schools were 
fully funded. Later, the Dutch State paid all the costs for the parochial schools 
as well. In independent Latvia, the state paid for Jewish schools too. 
This information on institutions has been expanded by school statistics. 
After World War I, in Vienna 5% of all the Jewish pupils attended a Jewish pri-
mary school, as was the case with 15% in Berlin, 30% in Frankfurt, and 80% 
in Riga. After 1920, 20% of the Jewish pupils attended Jewish schools in 
) 
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TABLE3 
CHANGES IN JEWISH-GENTILE INTERMARRIAGE IN THE EARLY 20m CENTURY IN SIX EUROPEAN CITIE5 
AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Jewish-Gentile 
intermarriage Decrease in Increase in Increase in Jewish-
allowed before or residential political anti- Gentile 
Ci~ after 1900 segregation Semitism intermarriage 
Amsterdam 1 1 2 3 
Berlin 1 5 5 5 
Budapest 2 4 4 
Frankfurt 6 6 6 
Riga 2 4 1 1 
Vienna 2 3 3 2 
1 =before 1900 1 = strongest 1 =weakest 1 = strongest 
. 2 =after 1900 decrease increase increase 
6 = strongest 6 = strongest 6=weakest 
increase increase increase 
Sources: see text 
Budapest, before that 10%. These percentages placed Berli.I). and Budapest ex 
aequo. However, given the institutional differences between the two cities, edu-
cational segregation was stronger in Berlin than in Budapest. In Berlin, Jewish 
pupils probably attended Simultanschule, so that Christian children at parochial 
schools were not likely to encounter Jewish pupils. 
It was difficult to place Amsterdam in our ranking of cities according to edu-
cational segregation. There 5% of all the Jewish pupils attended Jewish schools. 
This would put Amsterdam on a par with Vienna. But in addition to mixed 
schools, Amsterdam had special Catholic and Protestant primary schools. In 
1900, 30% of all the pupils attended these schools, as did 50% in 1940. These 
children, unlike the Christian pupils in Budapest or Vienna, never met any 
Jewish pupils at school. We arbitrarily13 regard Jewish-Gentile educational seg-
regation in Amsterdam as less sizeable than in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Riga, and 
more considerable than in Budapest and Vienna. In column 4 of Table 1 we rank 
the six cities according to the extent to which their primary schools segregated 
or mixed Jewish and Gentile pupils. We have been unable to rank cities accord-
ing to the increase or decrease in school segregation. 
\ 
/ 
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Orthodoxy 
It is safe to assume that in the cities considered here, Orthodox Judaism was 
strongest in Riga. The influx of Hasidim from the Pale of Settlement offset the 
effects of the German Reform. According to Vestermanis (1995: 25), in 1907, 
Riga had six large synagogues and six prayer houses for 25,000 Jews. In the 
1930s there were seven synagogues and 27 minyanim for 40,000 Jews. 
According to the official figures, in 1920 about 10% of Budapest's Jews 
belonged to the Orthodox community, the others were Neolog (Laszlo 1969: 
142 and 150-151). The election returns for the Kultusgemeinde in the 1920s led 
Freidenreich (1991: 117 and 121) to guess that 20% of the Viennese Jews were 
orthodox. This makes Budapest Jewry less orthodox than Viennese Jewry. 
Of Frankfurt's 28,000 Jews, 15% were listed by a separate Orthodox Jewish 
community, which owned a 2000-seat synagogue. Another Jewish community 
owned four synagogues with 4,000 seats, two of which adhered to the tradi-
tional rituals. They had 2,000 seats (Heuberger & Krohn 1988: 160-167). Thus 
30% of the Jews of Frankfurt was orthodox, and 60% of all the synagogue seats 
were at the orthodox synagogues. 
We have been unable to estimate the percentage of orthodox Jews in 
Amsterdam and· Berlin. However, around 1930 some 20% of all the 21,000 
seats for the 170,000 Jews of Berlin were at orthodox synagogues (Galliner 
1987). This makes Berlin less orthodox than Frankfurt. Amsterdiun had no sep-
arate Orthodox and Reform synagogues. We hold that the lower the number of 
Jews to one synagogue.seat, the more orthodox a city's Jews~ In 1900 (1938), 
the nine (seven) synagogues of Amsterdam held 4,800.(4,500) seats for 60,000 
(70,000) Jews (Meijer 1935: 42). In Amsterdam, the number of·Jews a seat was 
14, in Berlin it was 8, and in Frankfurt 5. Thus, Amsterdam appears to have 
been less orthodox than Berlin. 
In Vienna at the end of World War I, the seven synagogues of the official 
Jewish community had 5,000 seats for 200,000 persons or 40 persons a seat. 
However, Vienna also had 16 associational synagogues and 81 private prayer 
houses, which barely existed in Amsterdam. All in all, there were 20,000 seats 
for the Jews of Vienna or one seat for 10 Jews (Freidenreich 1991: 119-120). 
The seats at the associational synagogues· and private prayer houses were not 
included in the Berlin figures. So if we are to merge our rankings, the figures 
on the number of Jews to each seat in Berlin will have to be revised. Berlin had 
100 associational synagogues and private prayer houses (Galliner 1987: 92) and 
we assume that each of them had 100 places. This yields a figure of 5 persons 
a seat. Vienna appears to have been less orthodox than Berlin and more ortho-
dox than Amsterdam. This leaves Amsterdam and Budapest. If there were seven 
synagogues and a few private prayer houses for 70,000 Amsterdam Jews and a 
total of 125 official and private places of worship for 215,000 Budapest Jews 
(Gruber 1994: 152), Amsterdam was less orthodox. 
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Column 5 of Table 1 ranks the cities according to the orthodoxy of their 
Jews. 
Political anti-Semitism 
Of the six cities, Vienna before World War I was the most anti-Semitic in a 
political sense. Although the Austrian Emperor twice refused to appoint Lueger 
- who opportunistically opposed Jewry - as Mayor of Vienna, he did consent 
in 1897. Lueger remained in power until his death in 1910. A plan to place 
Jewish pupils in separate classes was never approved. 
In the 1920s, anti-Semitism was most evident in Hungarian politics. Jews 
were held responsible for the Red Terror of 1919 and a numerus clausus 
restricted their access to the universities. At the elections for the National 
Council, the party that backed this law received 18% of the Budapest vote in 
1926, 21% in 1931, and 26% in 1935. Its successor at the 1939 elections, the 
Party of Hungarian Life, got 33 % of the vote in Budapest The more anti-
Semitic Arrow Cross Party, which was "forbidden to take part in the 1935 elec-
tions, got 25 % of the Budapest vote in 1939. 
Given the unique nature of the Kristallnacht, political anti-Semitism in the 
1930s was strongest in Germany. In the elections for the Reichstag, the 
National SocialistParty got 3% of the vote in 1926, 18% in 1930, and 38% in 
July 1932. In 1932, the Swastika got 29% of the votes in Berlin .and 39% in· 
Frankfurt (Pulzer 1992: 300 and 314 ). In Austria, at several Reichsrat elections 
in the 1920s, the pro-German parties got 15% of the vote. At the 1930Reichsrat 
election in Vienna~ the sister party of the German National Socialists got 10% 
of the vote and 17% at the Landsrat elections of 1932. It was outlawed in 1933. 
The 1922-1934, Latvian Parliament consisted of 100 members representing 
20 parties. The Farmers' Union and the German Bloc adopted an anti-Semitic 
stand (Laserson 1971: 162, 171, 185). The parties of the Right Wing were sup-
posedly even more anti-Semitic. For our estimate of the anti-Semitic vote in 
Riga, we have used use the classification of party names in Bilmanis ( 1951: 
342-343) and the Riga results at the 1931 Parliament elections. In this way, we 
arrived at 20% for all the parties collectively. In 1927, a putsch by the fascist 
Thunder Cross failed (Laserson 1971: 143) and led to a ban on this movement. 
In 1935, a National Socialist party took part for the first time in a Dutch 
election and got 11% of the Amsterdam vote for the Provincial States. At the 
National Parliament elections in 1937, it got 6% of the Amsterdam vote and at 
the 1939 elections for the Amsterdam Municipal Council it got 7% (DeJonge 
1968: 101, 127, and 153). 
Data on political anti-Semitism around 1930 are summarized in column 6 of 
Table 1. Table 3, column 3 gives the ranking of the six cities after the increase 
in the support for anti-Semitism in the period from 1900 to 1940. 
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7. Testing hypotheses on differences between cities 
We now test hypotheses on the differences between the cities as regards Jewish-
Gentile intermarriage. In section 8, we determine how well the best hypothesis 
of section 7 performs when explaining trends within the cities. Section 9 focus-
es on Jewish-Gentile intermarriage just before it was banned. In section 10, we 
view trends in Catholic-Jewish and Jewish-Protestant intermarriage against the 
background of changes in Catholic-Protestant intermarriage. 
Jewish-Gentile intermarriage ascertained by odds ratios 
To determine the extent of intermarriage within a city at specific points in time, 
we have computed log odds ratios (discussed by Blalock 1987: 311-312).14Take 
a 2*2 table classifying the religion of husbands (Jewish or Gentile) against that 
of their wives (again: Jewish or Gentile). The total number of Jewish men who 
marry Jewish women is a, b represents the number of Jewish men who marry a 
Gentile woman, c stands for the number of Gentile men who marry a Jewish 
woman, and dis the number of Gentile-Gentile weddings. In this case, the odds 
ef a Jewish man marrying a J~wish instead of a Gentile woman are alb and the 
··odds of a Gentile man marrying a Jewish rather than a Gentile woman c/d. Then 
the ratio of these odds is (alb)l(cld) and the log odds ratio will amount to 
log(( alb )l(cld)). A log odds ratio of zero indicates random mating. A relatively 
low figure in a table or a downward sloping line in a graph indicates more inter-
mairiage and a line that goes up or a higher figure indicates less intermarriage. 
Iil order to test our hypotheses more severely, we have determined trends in log 
odds ratios for Jewish-Protestant, Jewish-Catholic, and Jewish-Other marriages 
separately. 
The emancipation and the intermarriage laws hypothesis 
We now test whether our hypothesis about intermarriage laws is more applica-
ble than our hypothesis about the date of emancipation. To reduce zigzagging 
of the lines on the graphs, we have computed three-year averages of the log 
odds ratios. We have not been able to represent values of infmity. for Vienna and 
Riga before World War I. When testing the hypotheses, we obviously disregard 
data from the later 1930s. We return to these figures in section 8 when testing 
our exclusion thesis. 
Figure 1 shows that during World War I, there was a rise in Jewish-
Protestant intermarriage. From 1900 until the 1930s, the lines go down, indi-
cating more intermarriage. More to the point, the lines hardly cross. The rank-
ing of the six cities from more to less Jewish-Protestant intermarriage is: 
Budapest - Berlin - Frankfurt -Amsterdam - Vienna - Riga. 
Figure 2 for Catholic-Jewish intermarriage yields the same grading of the 
cities as Figure 1. Figure 3 is a bit blurry, which is not surprising given the low 
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Figure 1 
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Figure2 
Jewish-Catholic intermarriage 1900-1943 
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Figure 3 
Jewish-Other intermarriage 1900-1943 
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percentage of people of Other religions in our tables. This percentage was low-
est in Budapest, i.e. 2% around 1930. Given the Austrian marriage l!iws, it is 
not surprising that Jewish-Other marriages were most widespread in Vienna. 
Riga had the least intermarriage, Amsterdam the lowest but one. Berlin, 
Budapest, and Frankfurt are more or less on a par. Before World War I, the 
chances of a marriage between Jews and Others were lowest in Budapest and 
highest in Berlin. After World War I, Budapest had the highest chances and 
Frankfurt the lowest. Frankfurt had less Jewish-Other marriages than Berlin. 
We take the grading of the six cities according to the incidence of Jewish-Other 
marriages to be the same as their ranking according to Catholic-Jewish and 
Jewish-Protestant marriages. We add this order as column 7 to Table 1. 
Our grading of cities according to intermarriage is subject to certain excep-
tions. For instance, since 1927, Jewish-Protestant intermarriage was more like-
ly in Amsterdam than Frankfurt. We list and address these anomalies in section 
10. 
To test the ranking of the cities according to intermarriage as predicted by 
our emancipation hypothesis against the intermarriage ranking we just obtained 
empirically, we compare columns 1 and 7 in Table 1. Riga is predicted correct-
ly, Vienna is half a place off the mark, Berlin and Frankfurt one place, 
Amsterdam three, and Budapest three and a half places. Does our marriage 
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laws hypothesis perform better? Comparing columns 2 and 7 in Table 1, Riga 
and Vienna are predicted correctly, Berlin and Frankfurt are almost on the mark, 
Amsterdam and Budapest remain three places off. Jews and Gentiles from 
Amsterdam had lower chances of intermarrying than expected, in Budapest 
they had higher chances than predicted. Our marriage laws thesis fares better 
than our emancipation hypothesis. But it does not fully fit. 
The anti-Semitism and the orthodoxy hypothesis 
Which of the other hypotheses does account for the Amsterdam and Budapest 
anomalies? Does the anti-Semitism hypothesis point towards the crucial inter-
vening factor? According to column 6 in Table 1, Amsterdam had the lowest 
anti-Semitic vote and relatively low chances of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage, 
and Budapest had relatively strong anti-Semitism and a relatively high chance 
of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. Our hypothesis on Gentile dislikes has not 
been confirmed. Our orthodoxy hypothesis does away with the exception of 
Budapest: Budapest Jewry was the second least orthodox. However, in column 
5 of Table 1, Amsterdam remains an outlier. Its Jewry was the least orthodox of 
all the cities. 
Segregation hypotheses 
To test our educational segregation hypothesis, we turn to column 4 in Table 1. 
This hypothesis seems to explain our,anomalies for the intermarriage laws 
hypothesis rather well; Amsterdam and Budapest are boUl only one place away 
from where they should be. However, Bei-lin and Frankfurt are now two places 
off the mark, and Vienna four. This is quite unsatisfactory. 
Our residential segregation hypothesis best explains the Amsterdam and 
Budapest anomalies. In column 3 of Table 1, Amsterdam has the highest resi-
dential segregation of the six cities and Budapest the lowest. Other information 
in this column also supports the hypothesis that residential segregation is the 
most important intervening factor between the introduction of laws permitting 
Jewish-Gentile marriages and their actual prevalence. Residential segregation 
was the second lowest in Berlin, the third highest in Vienna and the second 
highest in Riga. As to the rankings in columns 3 to 6 in Table 1, all in all the 
ratings in column 3 for residential segregation coincide the closest with the 
order in column 7 of this table. 15 
8. fiends explained by changes in residential segregation? 
Our provisional explanation of Gentile-Jewish intermarriage differences 
between cities yields dynamic derivations. One of them holds that in cities 
where the laws permitting religiously mixed marriages were passed most 
recently, the increase in Jewish-Gentile intermarriage will be stronger.16 
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Another one holds that if residential segregation increased or decreased, so did 
intermarriage. To test these new predictions, we add a column to Table 3. It 
ranks cities according to the increase or decrease in Jewish-Gentile intermar-
riage between 1900 and the early 1930s. 
In Figure 1, the log odds ratio for Jewish-Protestant marriages drops from 9 
to 5 in Amsterdam, from 7 to 5 in Budapest, from 7 to 6 in Berlin, and from 8 
to 7 in Frankfurt. For Riga it drops from 12 to 10 and, for Vienna from infinity 
to 8. Figure 2 for Catholic-Jewish intermarriage affrrms that for Berlin and 
Frankfurt, the log odds ratios decrease the least. For Berlin, the log odds ratio 
drops from 8 to 7, for Frankfurt from a bit above to a bit below 8. Amsterdam 
exhibits a decline from 9 to 7, Budapest from 7 to 5, Riga from infinity to 11, 
and Vienna from inf"mity to 8. Figure 3 for Jewish-Other intermarriage corrob-
orates that changes are smallest in Berlin and Frankfurt: the lines hover around 
6. The overall increase in Gentile-Jewish intermarriage in Frankfurt is smaller 
than in Berlin. According to Figure 3, the log odds ratio for Jewish-Other mar-
riages in Amsterdam drops from 9 to 6 and in Budapest from 7 to 6. All·in all, 
the chances of Gentile-Jewish intermarriage increase more in Amsterda.J:n than 
in Budapest. In.Vienna~ not unexpectedly, the log odds ratio for Jewish-Other 
marriages increases from 3 to 6. The log odds ratio. for Riga falls from inf"mity 
to 9. The overall iticte~e in the chances of Gentile-Jewish inte~arriage is larg-
er in Riga and Vienna than in Amsterdam. The increase in these chances for 
Vienna is larger than for Riga. We now fill column 4 of Table 3. 
Which of our hypotheses explains the changes in the chances of i.ntermar-
riage best? We hold that the strong increase in Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in 
Riga and Vienna can be explained by the recent introduction of laws permitting 
this type of marriage (compare column 1 with column 4 of table 3). To explain 
the weak and sometimes non-existent trend towards more Jewish-Gentile inter-
marriage in Berlin and Frankfurt, our anti-Semitism hypothesis might be 
applied (column 3 of Table 3). However, this hypothesis cannot explain the 
increase in intermarriage in Budapest in the 1920s, when political anti-
Semitism was on the rise there. Our residential-segregation hypothesis does 
explain the stability of the chances of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in the 
German cities and their increase in Amsterdam and Budapest. Jewish-Gentile 
residential segregation decreased in Amsterdam and Budapest and rose in 
Berlin and Frankfurt (column 2 of Table 3). 
Until now, we have only considered trends in intermarriage during 1900-
1943. In the next section, we study changes just before Gentile-Jewish inter-
marriage was banned. Section 10 examines the extent to which intermarriage 
became more common in all the cities after World War I. 
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9. Shortly before Jewish persecution: the exclusion hypothesis 
Our exclusion hypothesis holds that Jewish-Gentile intermarriage did not 
decrease before the laws forbidding it were introduced in the 1930s or 1940s, nor 
did it decrease before the legal position of Jews began to otherwise deteriorate. 
Its incidence did not decrease until afterwards. Table 4 gives all the available log 
odds ratios for each of the six cities for all the years from 1930 to 1943. Shadings 
indicate the years when specific measures were taken against Jews. 
In Table 4, there is no decrease for Amsterdam in Jewish-Protestant intermar-
riage before the German occupation of the Netherlands, nor in 1940, and a strong 
decrease in 1941. In early 1942, Jewish-Gentile intermarriage was prohibited in 
Amsterdam, and Jewish-Protestant intermarriage witnessed a sharp fall. Jewish-
Protestant intermarriage remained stable in Berlin from 1930 to 1933, but 
decreased drastically after 1933. In Frankfurt, Jewish-Protestant marriage 
remained stable from 1930 to 1933 and fell sharply in 1934. Intermarriage thus 
decreased before the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws, but not before Hitler 
became Chancellor. Jewish-Protestant intermarriage in Budapest was stable 
before the First Jewish Law and declined from 1938 on with a sharp decrease 
after Jewish-Gentile marriages were forbidden in 1941. In Vienna, Jewish-
Protestant intermarriage began to decrease. after the Anschluss, not before it. 
·Jewish-Protestant intermarriage was stable in Riga. 
Our hypothesis can also ·be tested against the figures for Jewish-Catholic 
intermarriage in Table 4. Almost the same results have been obtained. There is 
one difference, i.e. Jewish:.catholic intermarriage began to ·diminish in 
Amsterdam in 1940. In addition, are the high log odds ratios for Amsterdam in 
1936 and 1939 statistical wobbles? The figures for Jewish-Other marriages in 
Table 4 reinforce these impressions. All in all, the part of our exclusion hypothe-
sis that holds that Jewish-Gentile intermarriage did not decrease before the adop-
tion of laws forbidding it can be rejected. The part stating that it did not diminish 
before the legal status of Jews began to decline in other respects is confirmed. We 
test the latter part more stringently in the next section. 
10. Jewish-Gentile compared to Catholic-Protestant intermarriage 
In section 8, we have noted the changes that took place from 1900 to 1943. In 
Figures 1 and 2 if we only focus on the 1920s, Jewish-Protestant intermarriage 
remains stable in Berlin, as does Catholic-Jewish intermarriage in Berlin and 
Frankfurt. Both of these types of mixed marriages increased elsewhere. This find-
. ing is quite striking. 
In section 7, when ranking the cities according to the chances of Jewish-
Gentile intermarriage before National Socialism in Germany in 1933, we alluded 
to certain exceptions to the rule. In the early decades of the 20th century, inter-
r-
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City 
Amsterdam 
Berlin 
Budapest 
Frankfurt 
Riga 
Vienna 
Amsterdam 
Berlin 
Budapest 
Frankfurt 
Riga 
Vienna 
Amsterdam 
Berlin 
Budapest 
Frankfurt 
Riga 
Vienna 
TABLE4 
LOG ODDS RATIOS FOR JEWISH-PROTESTANT, JEWISH-CATHOLIC AND JEWISH-OfHER INI'ERMARRIAGE IN SIX EUROPEAN CITIES 1930-1943 
1930 1931 1932 1933 
Jewish-Protestant intermarriage 
6.3 7.0 6.4 6.6 
6.2 6.5 6.3 
4.8 5.0 4.9 
6.6 6.4 6.9 
10.7 11.0 11.0 
• 8.4 8.5 • 
Jewish-Catholic intermarriage 
'7.0 6.6 6.4 6.5 
6.7 7.4 7.0 
4.8 4.8 4.7 
7.6 7.6 7.8 
10.1 
• 8.0 7.6 • 
Jewish-Other intermarriage 
5.6 5.3 5.7 
6.2 6.2 5.8 
5.4 5.4 5.5 
7.8 5.4 5.7 
10.8 10.5 9.8 
• 5.7 5.7 • 
• missing data 
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
complete closure 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 
Jewish-Gentile intermarriage is forbidden 
Sources: see Appendix 
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marriage was less common in Amsterdam than in Berlin and Frankfurt. We also 
observe a general increase in intermarriage. However, starting in 1927, the 
chances of Jewish-Protestant intermarriage were higher Amsterdam than in 
Frankfurt. In addition, from 1926 onwards, Amsterdam had higher chances of 
Catholic-Jewish intermarriage than Frankfurt. And after 1931, the chances of 
Catholic-Jewish intermarriage were higher in Amsterdam than in Berlin. Given 
that the category 'Other' is so mixed, we do not consider the findings on Jewish-
Other intermarriage. Were the reversals just freaky aberrations? If not, what do 
they indicate? 
Until now we have only considered the integration of Jews and Catholics, and 
Jews and Protestants. We have not focused on the distance between Catholics and 
Protestants. Perhaps as far as marriage goes, the distance between Catholics and 
Jews and between Protestants and Jews was vast. But how large was the distance 
between Catholics and Protestants? And how much larger was the distance 
between Catholics or Protestants and Jews than the distance between Catholics 
and Protestants? In other words, how large was not only absolute, but also rela-
tive Gentile-Jewish intermarriage? In addition, to what extent does the grading of 
the cities according to the distance between Gentiles and Jews remain the same if 
the extent of relative rather than the extent of absolute Gentile-Jewish intermar-
riage is studied? For which years do the rankings of Amsterdam and Berlin and 
·of Amsterdam and Frankfurt reverse in this connection? 
Figure 4 
Jewish-Protestant intermarriage 1900-1943 
after taking Catholic-Protestant· intermarriage into account 
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We do not present a graph, but in our cross-classifications of the religions 
of husbands and wives, Catholic-Protestant' intermarriage is the most wide-
spread in Budapest (a log odds ratio below 1) and the least frequent in Vienna 
(a log odds ratio of 5, increasing a bit with the passage of time). The log odds 
ratio is somewhat lower for Berlin than for Frankfurt (both a bit below 2 and 
demonstrating a drop). The log odds ratio is slightly above 2 in Amsterdam, 
with a slight increase after World War I. The log odds ratio for Catholic-
Protestant intermarriage in Riga is 4. 
For Figure 4, we have subtracted the log odds ratio for Protestant-Catholic 
intermarriage from the log odds ratios for Protestant-Jewish intermarriage pre-
sented in Figure 1. For Figure 5, we have done the same for Catholic-Jewish 
intermarriage, as represented in Figure 2. Once again, Figures 4 and 5 show that 
in all six of the cities, the lines go down over the whole period. But in the 1920s 
the lines for Berlin and Frankfurt look quite horizontal. 
The surprise in Figures 4 and 5 is Vienna. In section 7, of the six cities 
Vienna is the one where Jewish-Gentile intermarriage is least common after 
Riga. However,· the extent of Catholic-Jewish and Jewish-Protestant intermar-
. riage, as compared tO. Catholic-Protestant intermarriage, is weaker in Vienna 
·than. in the other cities. The superficial· exp~ation of this finding is that in 
Vienna there was not only a large distarice between. Gentiles and Jews, but also 
between CathQlics and Protestants. 
Figure 5 
Catholic-Jewish intermarriage 1900-1943 
after taking Catholic-Protestant intermarriage into account 
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In Figures 4 and 5, as in Figures 1 and 2, the Budapest and Riga lines do not 
cross the Berlin and Frankfurt lines. The Amsterdam lines do. They intersect in 
Figures 1 and 2 as well. Exactly when did the extent of absolute and relative 
Gentile-Jewish intermarriage become larger in Amsterdam? 
TABLES 
YEARS WHEN CATHOUC-JEWISH AND JEWISH-PROTESTANT INTERMARRIAGE BECAME MORE WIDESPREAD 
IN AMSTERDAM COMPAREDWITHBERLINANDFRANKFURT, TAKING(1)ANDNOTTAKING(2)CATHOLIC-
PROTESTANT INTERMARRIAGE INTO ACCOUNT 
Comparison 
Catholic-Jewish intermarriage Amsterdam-Berlin 
Catholic-Jewish intermarriage Amsterdam-Frankfurt 
Jewish-Protestant intermarriage Amsterdam-Berlin 
Jewish-Protestant intermarriage Amsterdam-Frankfurt 
(1) 
1931 
1926 
1934 
1927 
(2) 
1926 
1918 
1927 
1917 
We li&tthe findings in Table 5, where we compare Amsterdam with Berlin and 
Frankfurt as regards Catholic-Jewish and Jewish-Protestant intermarriage. For 
both types of intermarriage, Amsterdam comes to exceed. both Berlin and 
Frankfurt. This happens for the extent of relative Gentile-Jewish intermarriage 
earlier than for the extent Gentile-Jewish intermarriage, which does not take 
Catholic-Protestant intermarriage into account This pattern is cortsistent. 
So in the 1920s, Jewish-Gentile intermarriage was stable in two major cities 
in the country where National Socialism came to power in the 1930s, before the 
other countries considered here came to be governed by National Socialism. In 
that decade, the distance between Jews and Gentiles remained so large in Berlin 
and Frankfurt that the Jews and Gentiles of Amsterdam came to intermarry more 
than the Jews and Gentiles of Berlin and Frankfurt. 
It might be relevant to note here that although Jewish-Gentile intermarriage 
did not decrease absolutely before National Socialism rose to power in Germany, 
it did not increase as fast in Berlin and Frankfurt as in Amsterdam. Indeed, given 
our figures, it remained rather stable in an absolute and even more so in a relative 
sense in Berlin and Frankfurt throughout the 1920s. A new political party was 
campaigning against the Jews at the time. It did hot get a lot of votes. Yet, the 
country where Jewish-Gentile intermarriage remained relatively stable in the 
legally liberal1920s was the first to adopt laws forbidding Jewish-Gentile inter-
marriage in the 1930s. The ·smaller the chances that the right for Jews and 
Gentiles to intermarry is exercised in a country, the higher the likelihood this 
country's Jews will later lose their right to marry Gentiles. 
\ 
/ 
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11. Summing up 
Maintaining that the distinction between Jews and Gentiles was a dimension of 
stratification in various European countries in the early 20th century and that 
intermarriage indicates integration, this article has analyzed data on Jewish-
Gentile intermarriage in Amsterdam, Berlin, Budapest, Frankfurt, Riga, and 
Vienna from 1900 to 1943. It has thus addressed the extent to which Gentile-
Jewish intermarriage actually occurred in the years when it was permitted by law 
and tested hypotheses explaining the extent to which the right of Gentiles and 
Jews to intermarry was llCtuallY put into effect. Our findings are six-fold. 
To begin with, in the early 20th century, the chances of Jewish-Gentile inter-
marriage were on the rise. This finding supports the idea that integration was the 
destiny of emancipated Jewry. 
The second fmding contradicts the hypothesis that the longer ago a city's Jews 
were legally emancipated, the more socially integrated they are. Jewish-Gentile 
intermarriage was rather unusual in Amsterdam, where Jews were emancipated 
relatively early and pretty widespread in Budapest, where intermarriage did not 
become permissible Uiltil rather late. In this respect, the idea of integration as the 
destiny of Jewry after emancipation has not been confirmed. 
Thirdly, a factor that better accounts for differences and developments than 
emancipation and laws is a city's residential segregation. Since this factor dries 
not feature in hypoth~ses postulating a prime mover, things do not always happen· 
as they are bound to happen. 
Fourthly, we have not found much evidence to support the hypo.thesis that the 
chances of intermarriage decreased as the anti-Semitic vote rose. Allhough the 
Nazis came to govern Germany first, there is no indication that Jewish-Gentile 
intermarriage was less likely in Berlin and Frankfurt than elsewhere. 
Intermarriage in Berlin and Frankfurt did not decrease in the years just before 
Hitler came to power. Nor did Jewish-Gentile intermarriage decrease in Vienna 
before the Anschluss or drop in Budapest before the 1938 First Jewish Law. 
The ftfth finding is that politics influences intermarriage. Not only in Berlin 
and Frankfurt, but in Amsterdam and Budapest as well, the chances of Jewish-
Gentile intermarriage fell shortly before mixed marriages were forbidden and 
after other anti-Jewish measures had been taken. 
The sixth finding is that Germany was exceptional. After the early 1920s, 
Jewish-Protestant intermarriage remained stable in Berlin, as did Catholic-Jewish 
intermarriage in Berlin and Frankfurt, and both types of intermarriage increased 
in Amsterdam, Budapest, and Vienna. Before World War I Jewish-Gentile inter-
marriage was stronger in Berlin and Frankfurt than in Amsterdam, but in the early 
1930s, Jewish-Gentile marriages were more common in Amsterdam. This was 
even more so if Jewish-Gentile intermarriage is compared to Catholic-Protestant 
intermarriage. 
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Our prime new hypothesis is as follows. We initially viewed the rise of an 
anti-Semitic party as a factor that might limit Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. 
We now think it is more accurate to say that a stronger dislike of Jews on the 
part of a city's Gentiles not only increases the percentage of votes for anti-
Semitic parties, but also lowers the extent of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage. 
An increase in anti-Semitism due to a country losing a war and an economy 
collapsing for whatever reason first manifests itself as less intermarriage and 
later as more votes for an anti-Semitic party. It takes time to launch an anti-
Semitic party, but it is easy for a Gentile to avoid a Jew. Things do not hap-
pen as they are bound to happen. But a weaker trend towards more Jewish-
Gentile intermarriage portends official persecution of the Jews in the near 
future. 
APPENDIX ON DATA SOURCES 
The intermarriage data were taken from: Statistisch jaarboek der gemeente 
Amsterdam; Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin; Statistisch-administra-
tives Jahrbuch der Haupt- und Residenzstadt Budapest; Statistisches 
Handbuch der Stadt Frankfurt am Main; Tabellarische iibersichten betref-
fend den Zivilstand der Stadt Frankfurt am Main im Jahre·J9xx; Statistisches 
Jahrbuch der Stadt Riga; Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien. Data on the . 
missing years were found in: Die Geburten, Eheschliessungen und Sterbefiille 
im Freistaat Preussen wiihrend des Jahres 19xx (Berlin data); Monatsheft des 
Budapester Kommunalstatistischen-Bureaus; H. Handruck (1932) Rigas 
naturliche Bevolkerungsbewegung 1911~1930, Riga: Veroffentlichungen des 
statistischen Amtes der Stadt Riga; Die Bewegung der Bevolkerung in den 
Jahren 1914 bis 1921, Vienna: Beitriige zur Statistik der Republik Oste"eich, 
8. Heft, 1923 (Vienna data); Statistisches Handbuchfiir die Republik 6ster-
reich, various years (Vienna figures). 
Data on residential segregation, educational segregation, and anti-Semitic 
voting are from the statistical yearbooks mentioned above. Additional data on 
residential segregation were found in: J. Vijgen (1983) Joden in Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam: Master's thesis in social geography, Universiteit van Amsterdam 
(data for Amsterdam 1906); Bureau voor Statistiek der Gemeente Amsterdam 
(1924) De resultaten der volks- en beroepstelling van 31 december 1920, 
Amsterdam: Muller; Bureau voor Statistiek der GemeenteAmsterdam (1934) 
De bevolking van Amsterdam Deel II: De uitkomsten der tienjaarlijksche 
Volkstellingen van 1830 tot 1930, Amsterdam: Meulenhoff; Berlin in Zahlen, 
Taschenbuch 1945 (figures for 1939); Die fiinfzigjiirige Entwicklung 
Budapests 1873-1923. Budapest: Publicationen des Statistischen Amtes der 
Haupt- und Residenzstadt Budapest; W. Gley (1936) 'Grundriss und 
Wachstum der Stadt Frankfurt am Main', S. 55-100 in: W. Hartke (Ed.), 
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Festschrift zur Hundertjahrfeier des Vereins fiir Geographie und Statistik, 
Frankfurt: Ravenstein (figures for Frankfurt). 
NOTES 
l. With this question, we go beyond Goldscheider & Zuckerman (1984: 92). It downplays an 
increase in Jewish-Gentile intermarriage with the observation that even in the 1930s, most 
European Jews married Jews. 
2. Gerhardt (1996) points out that Hitler's authority (in Weber's sense) was not simply rational-
legal, but mainly charismatic, and thus not characteristic of modem societies, but of pre-mod-
em ones. 
3. Sources on the constitutions are the Jiidisches Lexikon and the Encyclopaedia Judaica. 
Details on laws authorizing marriages between Gentiles and Jews have been taken from 
Ruppin (1934: 316-317), dates of 20th-century anti-Jewish legislation from the Encyclopedia 
of the Holocaust. 
4. Since we lack the data to test them, we do not derive three current hypotheses: (1) occupa-
tional segregation makes for less mixed marriage, (2) if Jews speak Yiddish at home, they are 
less likely to intermarry, and (3) the longer ago a Jewish person's. family migrated to. the city, 
the more likely this person is to marry a Gentile. 
5. Given the preponderance of historians in the literature on Gentile-Jewish relations, the oppor-
tunities have received less attention than the motivations. 
6. Thls is rational choice sociology. 
7. Integration and assimilation are different phenomena. Integration involves the creation of ties 
between groups .. Assimilation takes place when one gro~Jp disappears into another. 
Assimilation is not only a phase after integration, sometimes - if laws forbid intermarriage -
it is also one before it • • 
8. In addition, this argument adds an opportunity explanation to one of our wish hypotheses and 
thus elaborates our theoretical framework instead of the argument rejecting this approach. 
9. In the 1920s, Riga with 350,000, Amsterdam with 700,000, and Vienna with 2,000,000 inhab-
itants all had a 10% Jewish population. The 4,000,000 population of Berlin was 4%, the 
500,000 population of Frankfurt was 6%, and the 1,000,000 population of Budapest was 20% 
Jewish. 
10. Mixed marriages do not indicate assimilation, but conversions do. They do so less if they 
occur to surmount legal barriers to mixed marriages, and more so if people convert for other 
reasons. Honigmann (1989) shows that intermarriage figures are far more stable than conver-
sion figures. 
11. If a city's districts were subdivided (as was the case in Budapest and Riga), we merged the 
new into the old ones; if a city's area increased at the end of the period considered (Frankfurt, 
Vienna), we deleted the new districts. We corrected the 1906 Amsterdam figures by including 
the area annexed in 1920. 
12. Riga's 1920 figure is an unimportant exception. As a consequence of the evacuations during 
World War I, Riga's population in 1920 was half of what it was in 1913. 
13. Our findings in section 7 will not change if Amsterdam is one place higher or lower. 
14. The advantage of odds ratios above percentages is that odds ratios are not affected by the rel-
ative size of a religion, whereas percentages are. 
15. It is not wise to present correlations. 
16. The auxiliary assumption is that the later intermarriage becomes permitted, the more this 
option is perceived as real. 
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